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STANDING IN THE WAY OF CLARITY: HEIN V. FREEDOM FROM RELIGION
FOUNDATION, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In the waning days of the 2006 Term, the Supreme Court published a
series of fractured and controversial decisions, filled with fiery constitution-
al platitudes and passionate dissents. The most notable cases dealt with the
Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act, commonly known as McCain-
Feingold,' and a teenager extolling the virtues of "Bong Hits 4 Jesus!" to an
unsuspecting student audience.2 Although these cases received the lion's
share of the media coverage,3 another decision with arguably more impor-
tance, showcasing the jurisprudential face of the new Court, slipped out to
the presses. The case was Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,4
and it dealt with the often misunderstood and maligned issue of taxpayer
standing.
Standing is an issue in the back of any practitioner's mind as he enters
the federal courthouse. If you do not have it, you need it. If you have it, your
case has just begun. At its heart, standing is the answer to the question "who
can sue?", and over the years it has become a mix of constitutional and pru-
dential considerations affecting every plaintiff and shaping the very role of
the courts themselves.5
Over time, however, two distinct jurisprudences have sprung up side by
side as the Court has moved towards a constitutional basis for its standing
requirements. On one hand is the three pronged test of "injury-in-fact,"
"causation," and "redressability," which is at the heart of nearly every case
brought to court.' On the other is a shadow jurisprudence that eschews tradi-
tional standing tests in favor of a two-pronged analysis aimed at congres-
sional spending and the Establishment Clause in the context of taxpayer
suits.7 This wayward judicial meandering was born in the Court's landmark
1. See FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
2. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
3. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right,
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at Al.
4. 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
5. See, e.g., infra Part III.
6. See infra Part II.B.5.
7. See infra Part III.D. et seq.
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decision of Flast v. Cohen8 and has matured into an incoherent and formalis-
tic mess with the decision of Hein.9
This comment will seek to explore the Court's standing jurisprudence
as it has evolved from "cases and controversies" to a modem constitutional
doctrine. It will begin with a discussion of the Framers' judiciary and the
development of a modem standing doctrine.' ° It will then turn to the area of
taxpayer and citizen suits, exploring the judicial landmarks and landmines
from Frothingham v. Mellon to Flast." Next, it will explore the applications
and limitations of the Flast test during the Burger, Rehnquist, and early Ro-
berts Courts'2 before turning to the most recent decision of Hein.3 The
comment will conclude with a look into the future of taxpayer suits, a criti-
cal analysis of the Hein decision, and a recommendation that the Court re-
concile these wayward jurisprudences by abandoning Flast and applying a
uniform standing analysis across the board.'4
II. THE FRAMERS' JUDICIARY AND AN INTRODUCTION TO STANDING
DOCTRINE
The Court's standing doctrine is crucial in defining the role the judi-
ciary plays in our system of limited and divided government.' 5 Although the
role the founders envisioned for the judiciary is up for debate, an originalist
analysis 6 of the Constitution's text, key writings and decisions from the
founding generation, and the "original meaning"' 7 of words and phrases
provides a clear guidepost to understanding the Framers' Judiciary. 8 The
8. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
9. See infra Part VI.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part Ill.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part V.
14. See infra Part VI.
15. For a general discussion of standing doctrine and how it relates to conceptions of
judicial power, see the following articles for examples: Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and
the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REv. 777 (2004); Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the
United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine Is Looking for An-
swers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2239 (1999); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Stand-
ing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1741 (1999) (questioning the political application of
standing rules); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988).
16. For a general discussion of originalism as a judicial philosophy, see THE FEDERALST
SOCIETY, INSIDE ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE (Regnery 2007).
17. In most originalist schools, the term "original meaning" is a term of art that refers to
the original public meaning of the terms in the document at the time of its enactment.
18. A discussion of the overall role of the judiciary is beyond the scope of this comment;
therefore, this section will limit originalist analysis to select writings with an emphasis on
standing doctrine.
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following section will discuss the textual bases from which the standing
doctrine emerged and corresponding treatment of the founders' take on the
judiciary.' 9 Next, this section will trace the evolution of modem standing
doctrine from its roots in the English and American experience with writs of
certiorari and prohibition to the landmark Supreme Court decision of Lujan
v. Defenders of the Wildlife.2"
A. From Text to Experience
The necessary starting point for any discussion on standing is the text
of the Constitution. Over the last two hundred years, two aspects of this
text--one specific and one thematic-have set out the Court's understand-
ing of standing. The specific aspect, generally understood as the textual
hook for modem standing doctrine,2 is the limitation placed on federal judi-
cial power by Article III, section 2, which enumerates a set of justiciable
"cases and controversies" over which the federal courts may exercise judi-
cial power.22 The other basis for standing is the more thematic or structural
composition of federal power generally called the "separation of powers."23
Although this more thematic element cannot be attributed to a particular
clause, it shines through in the structure of the government established by
the Constitution: three distinct branches of government, each with a unique
function and role.
1. Article III, Section 2- "Cases and Controversies"
Article III, section 2, lists nine distinct categories of "cases and contro-
versies" over which the federal judiciary may exercise authority.24 Although
this list does not specifically address the issue of standing,25 its language has
served as a textual hook for the Court in numerous standing decisions.26 This
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see infra Part II.B.
21, See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case
or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1979); compare with Gene R. Nichol,
Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article II, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1915 (1986) (criticizing the
Court's continued "constitutionalization" of jurisdictional issues such as standing).
22. UNITED STATES CONST. art. III, § 2.
23. See UNITED STATES CONST. art. 1; UNITED STATES CONST. art. II; UNITED STATES
CONST. art. III; Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 881 (1983).
24. UNITED STATES CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Arthur Hellman, The Heritage Guide to
the Constitution 241 (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., The Heritage Foundation 2005). For a
discussion of the constitutional limits on federal judicial power, see Susan Bandes, The Idea
of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REv. 227 (1990).
25. In fact, the word "standing" is not found anywhere in the Constitution.
26. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
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list, if nothing else, limits the exercise of judicial power only to those suits
which fall within its purview.27
The language of Article III sets boundaries on the judiciary. Although
the meaning of its terms has been the subject of much scholarly debate both
"within and outside of the Court,"28 from the outset the text is not self-
defining and requires context in order to grasp its original meaning.
Federalist Number 80 is instructive. There, Publius29 noted that each
case and controversy enumerated in Article I1, section 2, describes a partic-
ular situation in which the rights protected by the Constitution are impli-
cated in actual disputes between adverse parties.30 These controversies arise
in a variety of situations, including the following: disputes of rights guaran-
teed by the laws of the United States or its Constitution; disputes between
States or citizens of different States; or even maritime disputes.3 In each
instance, the common denominator is an actual conflict. Although this may
not directly address the matter of who can sue, it does at least create a strong
presumption in favor of actual disputes between parties as envisioned in this
grant of authority. The overall structure of the Constitution provides a clear-
er foundation for interpretation.
2. General Structure of the Constitution: Articles I, , and IfI-
Separation of Powers Part One
From the beginning of the text to its last lines, the following three prin-
ciple themes permeate the Constitution: limited government, federalism, and
separation of powers. Although each of these themes is implicated whenever
federal power is exercised, regarding standing, none is more pronounced
than separation of powers. 2
Articles I through III establish three distinct, though sometimes over-
lapping, branches of government; each branch has unique powers and
checks on the other branches; each article vests an authority in each branch
27. See UNITED STATES CONST. art. III, § 2.
28. Compare Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English Prerogative Writs: The
Original Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 1001 (1997), with Cass R. Sunstein, What's
Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163
(1992).
29. "Publius" is the pseudonym adopted by John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James
Madison in a series of essays directed to the people of New York advocating ratification of
the new United States Constitution.
30. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 507 et seq. (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed.,
Random House 2001).
31. UNITED STATES CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
32. See generally Scalia, supra note 23.
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of government.3" The extent of such authority is not left to conjecture, but is
subsequently spelled out in the enumerated authorities the People delegated
to each branch.34 As Madison noted, the division of authority between the
branches serves as a check on each branch for the preservation of liberty.35
Liberty is preserved to the extent that each branch exercises only that lawful
authority granted by the Constitution.36 The importance of this thematic as-
pect of the Constitution has not been lost on the Court's standing jurispru-
dence, though from time to time its relevance has ebbed and flowed. 37 Nev-
ertheless, the Federalist Papers provide some guidance as to the judiciary's
role in the separation of powers.
"[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the
least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be
least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.,38 It was to be the least danger-
ous branch, which on its own lacked the power of the sword or the purse and
was to take no active resolution whatsoever. 39 The judiciary is the branch
that has neither force nor will, but merely judgment.40 It was the last place
liberty would be seized, so long as the power of judging was separated from
the legislative and executive powers.4' This is consistent with the purpose of
separating power between the branches as noted by Madison above, but it is
also dependent on the branches only exercising the authority lawfully
granted.
The extent of judicial power cuts to the heart of standing, especially
when dealing with the muddled issue of taxpayer standing, and here Publius
praised the independent judiciary. He repeatedly highlighted the importance
of an independent judiciary in a limited Constitution, noting that limitations
on the other branches were meaningless if there was no forum of courts
33. For example, Article I, section 1, states that "[a]ill legislative powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress." UNITED STATES CONST. art. I, § 1. Likewise Article II, section
1, begins by stating that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in a President .... UNITED
STATES CONST. art. II, § 1, and Article III, section 1, vests judicial power in the federal courts,
UNITED STATES CONST. art. III, § 1.
34. The author recognizes that the exact extent of the enumerated powers is a source of
much litigation. Nevertheless, the starting point for such discussions always, necessarily
begins with what powers the constitution specifically enumerates as to each branch.
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 330 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., Random
House 2001).
36. Id.
37. See infra Part III-V.
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 496 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., Ran-




41. Id. at 497.
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whose duty it was to declare acts contrary to the Constitution void.42 This
foundational role of the courts was not meant to render our democratic re-
public an oligarchy, but instead to recognize the role of the courts to interp-
ret laws, with the Constitution as the fundamental law,43 a point taken up by
Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.'
3. Marbury v. Madison: A Judiciary That Decides the Rights of Indi-
viduals
No discussion of the Court's standing doctrine would be complete
without first mentioning Marbury v. Madison.45 The opinion, written by
Chief Justice Marshall, prevented a Constitutional crisis and cemented the
important role of the judiciary in our national government.46 Aside from its
holding encapsulated in the statement that "an act of the legislature, repug-
nant to the Constitution, is void, '47 the decision provides a cogent discussion
of judicial power, which provides fodder for both sides of the standing de-
bate.48
In a brazen assertion of Anglo-American legal theory, Marshall stated
that "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an in-
jury."49 He further defined the judiciary's role in relation to such injuries in
42. Id.
43. Id. at 498.
44. 5 U.S. 137 (1803); see infra at Part II.B.2.
45. David E. Marion, Judicial Faithfulness or Wandering Indulgence? Original Inten-
tions and the History of Marbury v. Madison, 57 ALA. L. REv. 1041, 1041 (2006). For a view
emphasizing one of the many ways Marbury continues to impact the judicial landscape, see
Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1983).
46. Marion, supra note 45, at 1042.
47. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
48. There are two aspects of the Marbury decision that can lead to two contrary under-
standings of judicial power in the realm of standing. One perspective would see the admoni-
tion that "[t]he distinction, between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is ab-
olished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed," as an impera-
tive that the judiciary take an active role in enforcing the constitution against all violations.
Id. at 176. Note also the phrase, "[iut is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is." Id. at 177. The other perspective takes to heart the judi-
cial modesty encapsulated in the statement, "[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide
on the rights of individuals ... " Id. at 170. Both statements provide a contrast, one a state-
ment of raw judicial power to correct constitutional ills and the other a plea for judicial mod-
esty aimed at redressing only those ills that harm individuals. This tension between the judi-
cial desire to correct all constitutional wrongs and the modesty of staying within its constitu-
tional role is a repetitive theme that appears in the Court's standing jurisprudence, and it is
visible in the contrast between the general ban on taxpayer standing and the "exceptional"
rule of taxpayer suits in the Establishment Clause.
49. Id. at 163.
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stating, "[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of indi-
viduals . . . ."" In these two statements, whether known to Marshall or not,
the Chief Justice linked the proper exercise of judicial power to require-
ments of proper parties. The courts are in the business of redressing injuries,
and not just any injuries, but the injuries of individuals."
Although such statements taken on their own do not definitively end
the debate over how expansive the Court's standing doctrine should be, they
do evidence a clear specific injury requirement. Some no doubt argue that
this requirement could be met by congressional creation of individual legal
rights and causes of action or other novel theories, such as private attorneys'
general provisions,52 even if the individual link to such injuries is attenuated
at best. Although this argument has merit, the opinion in Marbury does con-
tain some guidance as to what sort of injuries it is referring.
In a discussion near the end of the opinion on the fundamental supe-
riority of the Constitution over acts of Congress, Marshall noted three hypo-
thetical situations involving a personally harmed individual." These harms
were either monetary or physical. 4 The first hypothetical presented an indi-
vidual suing to recover money seized under an illegal tariff.55 Such an injury
would be monetary in nature. In reference to the prohibition on ex post facto
laws, Marshall discussed an individual with the threat of condemnation to
death under such an invalid law,56 a reference to personal physical injury.
The third hypothetical dealing with treason presents much the same harm as
the second. 7 While seemingly minor in its implication on substantive inju-
ries, such language is nonetheless instructive as it showcases the Court's
early view on cognizable injuries.
B. The Evolution of Modem Standing Doctrine-From Founding to Lujan
From this brief discussion of the Framers' Judiciary, this section turns
to the evolution of modem standing doctrine. The concept of "standing,"
although always present in American law, has not always gone by that
name.5" The following section will provide a brief overview of the historical
50. Id. at 170.
51. See id.
52. Eric J. Segall, Standing Between the Court and the Commentators: A Necessity
Rationale for Public Actions, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 351, 396 (1993).
53. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 179-80.




58. For an article advocating a complete reassessment of the Court's standing jurispru-
dence, see Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68 (1984); see also Eric
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shifts in the Constitutional packaging of standing, shifts which correspond to
changes in the Court's approach to taxpayer standing. It will begin with a
discussion of the early Anglo-American experience with writs of prohibition
and certiorari-generally cited in favor of liberal access to the courts by
critics of the Court's generalized grievance prohibition.59 It will proceed to
discuss the "creation" of modem standing doctrine during the New Deal
era' and its evolution during the Warren6 and Burger62 Courts. This section
concludes with a brief encapsulation of modem standing principles as stated
by the Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.63
1. Early English and American Experience-Those Pesky Writs
Concurring in the 1951 decision of Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Commit-
tee v. McGrath,' Justice Felix Frankfurter sought to tie the Court's nascent
standing doctrine to America's long common law heritage.65 In particular, he
noted that federal courts must
not decide a question unless the nature of the action challenged, the kind
of injury inflicted, and the relationship between the parties are such that
judicial determination is consonant with what was ... the business of the
Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster when the Constitution was
framed.66
In response to Justice Frankfurter's assertions regarding the historical
necessity of standing, many critics, such as the late professor Louis L. Jaffe,
attacked his historical understanding, citing the use in English courts of cer-
tain prerogative writs during the eighteenth century.67 The principle position
of these scholars was that the English and their American counterparts were
quite content to entertain some proceedings in which the party invoking
judicial power lacked any personal interest in the relief sought.
68
This reading of the history has not gone without criticism. Other scho-
lars, such as Bradley S. Claton, have unearthed insights into the English and
B. Schnurer, "More than an Intuition, Less than a Theory ": Toward a Coherent Doctrine of
Standing, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 564 (1986).
59. See infra Part II.C.1.
60. See infra Part Il.C.2.
61. See infra Part II.C.3.
62. See infra Part II.C.4.
63. See infra Part II.C.5.
64. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
65. McGrath, 341 U.S. at 151 (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
66. Id. at 150.
67. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74
HARV. L. REv. 1265, 1308 (1961).
68. Clanton, supra note 28, at 1005.
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American use of writs of prohibition and certiorari, which call into question
the work of these earlier scholars.69 Contrary to the opinions of Professor
Jaffe and others, a "stranger" was not a person without an interest in the
relief sought; a "stranger" was merely a person who was not a party to the
litigation at hand.7"
If anything, the historical record shows that the matter is up for debate
in many academic circles. Nevertheless, the Court's jurisprudence has con-
tinued to evolve from the practice of the courts of Westminster, whatever
that may have been, to the modem rule of Lujan.
2. A "New Deal" on Standing
The history of "standing" doctrine is quite meager during the time be-
tween the Founding Fathers and the advent of the Progressive-New Deal
era, but the requirement of proper parties was still present. The Court was
very much concemed with the adjudication of concrete and personal rights
during this time-dismissing suits in which the parties were not proper to
litigate the issues raised. 7' That said, most scholars generally tie the emer-
gence of constitutional standing requirements to the changes on the Court
and in the country during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.72
One of the first cases espousing something closely resembling modem
standing was Frothingham v. Mellon,
73 discussed in more detail below, 74
which the Court decided in the early 1920s. Nevertheless, it was during the
next three decades, that the Court, led by Justice Frankfurter, began linking
the requirement of "standing" to the "case and controversy" aspects of Ar-
ticle III and our common law heritage.75 During this time period, the re-
quirement of a legally cognizable injury began to take shape, but it would
take another fifty years of doctrinal turmoil until the Court settled on a
clear-if not always consistent--definition and justification of the require-
ments of standing.
69. See id. (providing a thorough critique of Professor Jaffe's position).
70. Id. at 1010- 11 (citing S.M. Thio, Locus Standi and Judicial Review 81-82 (1971)).
71. See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doc-
trine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 691 (2004).
72. See, e.g., Woolhandler, supra note 71, at 689-90; Sunstein, supra note 28, at 166;
John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutio-
nalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1009 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing
and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1434 (1988); Steven L. Win-
ter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371,
1395 (1988).
73. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
74. See infra Part III.A.
75. Clanton, supra note 28, at 1001-02.
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3. Liberalization of Standing-The Warren Court
The Court took a renewed interest in the doctrine of standing during the
Warren era, expanding the categories of injuries that would meet the various
standing requirements.76 This expansive notion came to the forefront in the
case of Flast v. Cohen," discussed below.78 During this era, the Court de-
veloped a malleable "legal wrong" test, which allowed many people affected
by governmental decisions, including, for example, beneficiaries of federal
programs, to bring a challenge against the government.79 Standing was liber-
ally granted no matter how remote the interests of individuals affected by
certain regulatory decisions.8° This included radio listeners who sued be-
cause of insufficient regulatory protections and a whole host of environmen-
tal litigators.8
It was not just the Court that began loosening the rules of standing,
Congress also got into the act. During this period, Congress began creating
numerous "citizen suit" provisions in federal regulatory statutes, which in
effect allowed private individuals to "prosecute" federal agencies for failure
to obey congressional mandates.82 The constitutionality of these provisions
was not addressed by the Court until Lujan; however, these marked expan-
sions of standing did inevitably lead to a tightening and doctrinal strengthen-
ing of standing doctrine during the Burger Court.
4. Doctrinal Resurgence-The Burger Court
During the reign of the Burger Court, justices such as future Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist began linking the standing doctrine to the overall Constitu-
tional scheme of separation of powers.8 3 Citing the important relationship
between access to the courts and judicial power, these justices began toning
down the rhetoric of the Warren era and generally tightened standing lim-
its. These Burger era decisions laid the foundation for what would become
the Court's test in Lujan.
76. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 183.
77. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
78. See infra Part III.D.
79. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 183.
80. Id. at 184.
81. Id. at 183.
82. Id. at 192-93.
83. Dana S. Treister, Standing to Sue the Government: Are Separation of Powers Prin-
ciples Really Being Served?, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 689, 693 (1994).
84. Id. For a case that highlights a somewhat anomalous broad grant of standing during
the Burger Court, see United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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5. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: The Modern Test
As one of the seminal standing cases of the Rehnquist era, Lujan set
out an irreducible Constitutional minimum for the exercise of judicial pow-
er-one which could not be abdicated simply by the creation of a congres-
sionally approved cause of action.85 The case dealt primarily with statutory
"citizen suit" provisions and environmental regulation.86 In striking these
provisions, the Court, per Justice Antonin Scalia, stated that standing con-
tained three constitutional elements derived both from its source in the "case
and controversy" requirements of Article III and the general separation of
powers theme served throughout the Constitution.87
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"--that is, an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is both "concrete and particu-
larized" and "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'
88
Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the con-
duct complained of-in other words, the injury must be "fairly traceable" to
the defendant's actions.89 Finally, it must be "likely" as opposed to "specula-
tive" that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.'
In sum, the answer to "what's it to you?"9 ' is a person who suffered a
real injury that can be traced to the defendant's alleged malfeasance and that
the court can do something about. Generalized grievances-as the citizen
suits in question were termed-were out of the question as hallmarks of
judicial overreaching inconsistent with the purposes of separation of pow-
ers.92 Having reached the modem test for standing, the next section turns to
the twin issues of taxpayer and citizen standing.
85. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). For criticism of the
Court's holding and analysis, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170 (1993). For
a critique of the Court's increasingly formalistic application of the various standing rules,
including those derived from Lujan, see David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Para-
dox of Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 808
(2004).
86. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562.
87. Id. at 560-61.
88. Id. at 560.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 561.
91. This is the crucial question to all standing matters in determining why a party should
have a right to bring suit in federal court. See Scalia, supra note 23, at 882.
92. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577.
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III. TAXPAYER AND CITIZEN SUITS-LANDMARKS AND LANDMINES: FROM
FROTHINGHAM TO FLAST
Taxpayer and citizen suits have the perplexing distinction of being both
one of the most stable and yet most uncertain areas of standing law.93 This
section will provide the historical introduction to the Court's taxpayer and
citizen standing jurisprudence. It will begin with three cases that marked out
the pre-Flast consensus on taxpayer and citizen suits: Frothingham v. Mel-
Ion,94 Ex parte Levitt,95 and Doremus v. Board of Education.96 It will end
with a discussion of the case that many either consider a constitutional
landmine or doctrinal landmark, Flast v. Cohen.97
A. Frothingham v. Mellon
98
Every discussion concerning taxpayer standing inevitably begins with
the landmark decision of Frothingham v. Mellon. In 1923, the Court decided
whether a citizen as a federal taxpayer had a right to enjoin the execution of
a federal appropriations act on the twin grounds that it was invalid and
would result in taxation for an unconstitutional purpose.99 In a unanimous
decision written by Justice Sutherland, the Court rejected arguments in favor
of taxpayer standing and established the general bar against taxpayer
93. See generally Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misun-
derstood) Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771 (2003). This area is stable in the sense that
results tend to be the same-taxpayers lack standing-yet, its overarching justification has
shifted over time, leading to considerable confusion among courts and commentators about
the true nature of such suits. See infra Part VI.A-B.
94. See infra Part III.A.
95. See infra Part III.B.
96. See infra Part III.C.
97. See infra Part III.D.
98. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). The Court decided this case with a companion case, Massa-
chusetts v. Mellon. Id. That case, brought under the Court's original jurisdiction, dealt with a
State's ability to challenge the constitutionality of a congressional enactment. Id. at 483. The
Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter because it was not justiciable in charac-
ter. Id. The Court went on to say that the question was "political and not judicial in character,
and therefore [was] not a matter which admits of the exercise of the judicial power." Id. Such
a decision, voiding a federal enactment because of a State's objection, was akin to prior in-
stances where the issue was non-justiciable because of its political nature. Id. at 481-82 (cit-
ing Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. 50 (1867)). Decisions resolving the constitutionality of con-
gressional enactments as applied to states only arise where proprietary rights were involved.
Id. at 481-82. Such proprietary rights are almost exclusively related to a state's sovereignty.
Id. at 482 (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230 (1907) (dealing with the right of dominion of the State over the air and soil
within its domain)).
99. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486.
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suits' 0 -an unconditional bar that would remain in effect for nearly forty
years.O'
Frothingham challenged the constitutionality of a federal act commonly
known as the Maternity Act.0 2 The act aimed at reducing infant and mater-
nal mortality rates and generally protecting the health of mothers and their
children. 0 3 The act appropriated funds to those states that consented to its
application.1°4 The lower court dismissed the initial suit brought by Fro-
thingham. but she appealed the case to the Supreme Court for resolution of
the standing issue."' Her challenge amounted to an attack on the act because
it would increase her burden of taxation, now and in the future, in further-
ance of an unconstitutional program.'06
This case was the first time that the Court addressed the matter of tax-
payer standing in federal courts.'0 7 After noting the existence, and accep-
tance, of such standing in the municipal context, the Court rejected general
federal taxpayer standing.' 8 Contrasting municipal and federal govern-
ments, the Court noted that the relationship between a taxpayer and the fed-
eral government was of a far different order and magnitude than that of the
city and its taxpayer.'0 9 The question was one of scale and scope, and a citi-
zen's interest in his moneys in the federal treasury was simply one shared
with millions of others."0 His interest was so minute and indeterminable that
it could not afford a basis for equitable relief."'
The Court lacked the power "per se to review and annul acts of Con-
gress on the grounds that they are unconstitutional." ' 2 Such review only
existed where there was some direct injury suffered or threatened, which
presented a justiciable issue, resting on that act.' 13 Judicial review was mere-
ly a negative power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment, which oth-
erwise would stand in the way of enforcing an individual's legal right." 4 To
interpose judicial judgment on a congressional enactment, absent a direct
injury, would require the Court to assume a position of authority over the
100. Id. at 488.
101. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 91 (1968).




106. Id. at 486.
107. Id.




112. Id. at 488.
113. Id.
114. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 488.
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acts of another co-equal department, an authority that the Court clearly
lacked."5
Although the holding in Frothingham was quite clear-no federal tax-
payer standing' '-its reasoning has been subject to much scholarly de-
bate." 7 The principle question is whether the Court established a prudential
or constitutional bar to taxpayer suits. Language in the decision supports
both conclusions. As the Court itself would note in Flast v. Cohen, the re-
peated references to the minute interest of federal taxpayers in tax moneys
indicated a prudential concern-a concern more associated with the magni-
tude of the interest than any sort of constitutional analysis." 8 On the other
hand, language in the opinion clearly cited the separation of powers ratio-
nale taken up by later decisions as well as the need for a direct injury to
trigger judicial review."'9 Although some on and off the Court have found
the decision to create a merely prudential bar, ° subsequent decisions citing
Frothingham, such as Ex parte Levitt'2' and Doremus 22 indicate a far differ-
ent understanding.
B. Exparte Levitt' -Barring Citizen Suits
Concerns about taxpayer standing and ideologically motivated litiga-
tion go hand in hand with the Court's citizen suit jurisprudence. 124 Decided
over a decade after Frothingham, the Court's brief per curiam opinion in Ex
parte Levitt provides some indication of the constitutional limitation on citi-
zen standing. Like its predecessor, however, the Court in Ex parte Levitt
failed to indicate whether it sought to embrace wholeheartedly the constitu-
tional rationale implicit in its rejection of citizen suits.
115. Id. at489.
116. Id. at488.
117. See, e.g., John J. Egan III, Analyzing Taxpayer Standing in Terms of General Stand-
ing Principles: The Road Not Taken, 63 B.U. L. REv. 717, 730 (1983); Segall, supra note 52,
at 357-58; Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L.
REv. 255, 302-03 (1961). For a general discussion on the prudential and constitutional nature
of the bar on generalized grievances, see Ryan Guilds, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Genera-
lized Grievances as a Limitation to Federal Court Access, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1863 (1996).
118. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 93 (1968).
119. "To [allow taxpayer standing] would be not to decide a judicial controversy, but to
assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal depart-
ment, an authority which plainly we do not possess." Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 489.
120. See, e.g., Flast, 392 U.S. at 94; Jaffe, supra note 117, at 302-03.
121. See infra Part II.B.
122. See infra Part HI.C.
123. 302 U.S. 633 (1937).
124. For a discussion about the "democratic" aspects of broad standing grants to citizens
and taxpayers, see Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REv.
312(1997).
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Albert Levitt filed a pro se suit challenging the appointment of Hugo
Black to the Supreme Court. 125 He alleged that Black's appointment and
confirmation were null and void because Black was ineligible to serve on
the Supreme Court under Article I, section 6, clause 2, of the Constitution. 26
Levitt's only interest was that of a United States citizen. 127
In refusing to address the substance of his claim and implicitly reiterat-
ing the separation of powers rationale from Frothingham, the Court held
that citizenship alone was insufficient to entitle a private litigant to seek an
exercise of the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or
legislative action. 8 The Court rebuked such claims that are general and
common to all members of the public, citing the need for a private individu-
al to show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a
direct injury as the result of the challenged action before the Court would
invoke judicial review. 129 Citizen suits, like federal taxpayer suits before
them, were rejected as means of challenging constitutional impropriety.
C. Doremus v. Board ofEducation 3° -Taxpayers and the Establishment
Clause
In 1952, the Court decided another taxpayer standing suit, Doremus v.
Board of Education.31 This time, the Court dealt with an Establishment
Clause challenge to circumstances strikingly more pronounced than in the
later decision of Flast v. Cohen.3 2 In language clearly couched in constitu-
tional terms, the Court held that a plaintiff invoking the federal court as a
taxpayer could only successfully pursue that action if his injury were a di-
rect dollars and cents injury, not mere religious difference.
133
A New Jersey statute provided for the reading of five Old Testament
verses at the opening of each school day. 34 The plaintiffs in the case, Dore-
mus and Klien, challenged the act in state court as taxpayers and citizens.135
They alleged that the act violated the Establishment Clause of the First
125. Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. at 633.
126. Id. "No senator or representative shall, during the [t]ime for which he was elected,
be appointed to any civil [o]ffice under the [a]uthority of the United States, which shall have
been created, or the [e]moluments whereof shall have been [i]ncreased, during such time...
." UNITED STATES CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2.
127. Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. at 633.
128. Id.
129. Id.








Amendment as applied to the states.'36 The trial court and the New Jersey
Supreme Court upheld the act, despite the jurisdictional issue of standing.'37
Upon reaching the Supreme Court, the Court confronted the "case and con-
troversy" limitations on its own jurisdiction, prompting another examination
of taxpayer standing.
38
As previously held in Frothingham, the interests of a taxpayer in the
moneys of the federal treasury are too indeterminable, remote, uncertain,
and indirect to furnish a basis for appeal to the power of the federal courts.
139
A party must be able to show not only that a statute is invalid, but that he
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some "direct injury as a
result of enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way
in common with people generally."' 140 Without limiting a taxpayer's ability
to restrain unconstitutional acts that resulted in a direct pecuniary loss, the
Court reiterated that what was true for challenges of federal actions was
equally true of challenges to state actions.14' The only time a taxpayer suit
may meet the "case and controversy" burden was when it was a "good-faith
pocketbook action," not merely a religious difference. 42 It was not a ques-
tion of motivation, but possession of the requisite financial interest injured
by the unconstitutional action. 1
43
Couched in the constitutional language of modem standing, the Dore-
mus decision stands in marked contrast to the subsequent decision of Flast v.
Cohen.'44 Nevertheless, it was in the context of the Flast decision that the
Court once again addressed the matter of taxpayer standing and the Estab-
lishment Clause-moving away from an emphasis on the interests of the
parties towards the seriousness of the issue at hand. 41
136. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 430.
137. Id. at 432.
138. Id. at 434. It is worth noting that the Court declined to address the issue of taxpayer
standing in State court, confining its analysis to its own constitutional limitations. A similar
circumstance presented itself in the Cuno decision, discussed below; though that case dealt
with removal to federal court, not appeal. See infa Part IV.C.
139. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 433.
140. Id. at 434 (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 435.
144. See infra Part III.D.
145. Dissenting in Doremus, Justice Douglas argued in favor of standing because of the
importance of the issues at stake. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 435 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He
continued, "where the clash of interests is as real and as strong as it is here, it is odd indeed to
hold there is no case or controversy within the meaning of art. III, [§]2 of the Constitution."
Id. at 436. Douglas's broad notion of standing in Doremus would reemerge later in his Flast
concurrence. See infra Part III.D.3.
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D. Flast v. Cohen' 46 -Taxpayers and the Establishment Clause Revisited
Flast and several other individuals filed suit in federal court to enjoin
allegedly unconstitutional expenditures under the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965.147 The complaint alleged that Congress appropriated
federal funds to finance instruction and purchase supplies in religious
schools.'4 8 The plaintiffs alleged that this violated the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.'49 Each plaintiff made clear
in their complaints that standing rested "solely on their status as federal tax-
payers."'"5 A three judge panel addressed the standing issue and, relying on
Frothingham, ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.' 51 It was not
long until the Supreme Court became involved and once again took up the
issue of taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause context.
52
Flast constituted a monumental shift from the earlier precedents of
Frothingham and Ex parte Levitt. Setting aside the constitutional implica-
tions of those decisions, all the justices agreed that the bar on taxpayer suits
was prudential-the difference came with how each justice would respond
to that conclusion.'53 The majority and concurring opinions favored a grant
of standing, at least in the context of First Amendment Establishment Clause
cases, while Justice Harlan took a more restrained approach, critical of the
majority's holding, which advocated standing only where Congress express-
ly authorized via a private attorney general provisions in federal statutes.
This section will begin with Chief Justice Warren's opinion for an
eight-to-one Court in Flast. It will cover the Court's assessment of the Fro-
thingham bar,154 before addressing the new test for taxpayer standing
adopted by the Court.'55 After discussing the majority opinion, this section
will highlight the two contrasting opinions by Justice Douglas156 and Justice
Harlan.
157
146. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
147. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968).
148. Flast, 392 U.S. at 85-86.
149. Id. at 86.




154. See infra Part III.D.1.
155. See infra Part III.D.2.
156. See infra Part III.D.3.
157. See infra Part III.D.4.
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1. Taking a Fresh Look at the Frothingham Bar
Chief Justice Warren began by reexamining the holding of Frothing-
ham in order to decide whether it served as a constitutional or prudential bar
to taxpayer standing.'58 Noting that the barrier to taxpayer standing in that
case had never been breached, the Chief Justice nonetheless determined that
it was merely a prudential rule of judicial restraint.59 The Court in Fro-
thingham gave conflicting signals on the nature of the rule, yet for the Chief
Justice the concrete reasons rested primarily on something less than consti-
tutional footing. 6'
The statements made by the Frothingham Court about the relatively
minute nature of the taxpayer's bill indicated that she had been denied
standing, not because of her taxpayer status, but because her tax bill was
simply not large enough.' 6' Such statements and reasoning were purely in-
dicative of policy considerations. 62 Because there was nothing inherently
constitutional in the Frothingham decision, minimizing separation of powers
concerns, the Chief Justice saw no bar per se to taxpayer suits and turned to
the purpose behind standing and justiciability.1
63
2. Special Standing Rules-Two Prongs, One Test
Referring to the constitutional language of standing, the Chief Justice
stated that the Article III "case and controversy" requirement limited judi-
cial power.' 64 Those words required the courts to resolve real conflicts, de-
fming the precise role of the courts in the constitutional order. 65 These
words embodied the concept of justiciability. 66 Certain suits simply lacked
justiciability, one example being when a plaintiff lacked standing.
67
The doctrine ofjusticiability, particularly standing, had become a blend
of constitutional and policy considerations, and it was often difficult to as-
certain which concerns governed. 68 In this case, the government argued that
the constitutional scheme of separation of powers presented an absolute bar
to taxpayer suits because they involved no more than a mere disagreement
158. Flast, 392 U.S. at 91.




163. Id. at 94.
164. Flast, 392 U.S. at 94.
165. Id. at 95.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 97.
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about the spending of tax money. 169 Analyzing the role standing played in
the federal system, the Court dispatched and dismissed this argument and in
doing so created a new two pronged test for taxpayer standing. 70
a. Concrete adverseness and the personal stake of taxpayers
The crux of standing doctrine was "whether the party seeking relief had
'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
[the] concrete adverseness that sharpen[s] presentation of the issues."""
Whether a party had standing was distinct from whether the issue was itself
justiciable-that is, not a political question-which would implicate the
separation of powers.'72 The key to standing was a personal stake in the liti-
gated matter, not the substantive issues. 73
Practically ignoring the role of the Separation of Powers doctrine,
Chief Justice Warren went on to assert a taxpayer's stake in the potential
unconstitutional use of his or her tax dollars.'74 A taxpayer could surely have
a personal stake in federal taxing and spending programs; therefore, Article
III could not pose a bar to standing. 17' The sufficiency of that stake was the
subject of the remainder of the Court's opinion.
b. The Establishment Clause and beyond?
The Court established a two pronged test aimed at defining a taxpay-
er's stake for standing in the Establishment Clause context.'76 First, the tax-
payer must establish a logical link between that status (as taxpayer) and the
type of legislative enactment attacked.'7 7 Thus the taxpayer could only chal-
lenge spending provisions because those provisions explicitly relied on tax
monies."' Second, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status
and the precise nature of the alleged constitutional infringement.' 79 In other
words, the challenged enactment must exceed a specific constitutional limi-
169. Id. at 98.
170. Flast, 392 U.S. at 98-101.
171. Id. at 99 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
172. Id. at 100.
173. Id. at 101.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102.
177. Id.
178. Id. The opinion added the following caveat: this standard did not cover those actions




tation placed on the taxing and spending power, and not an action that just
generally exceeded Congress's enumerated powers. 8 '
The Chief Justice noted that the plaintiffs in this case satisfied the new
two pronged test and that such a holding was consistent with the prior deci-
sion of Frothingham.8' Here, the plaintiffs alleged a congressional appropr-
iation violated a specific prohibition on the exercise of that power, that is,
the Establishment Clause.'82 The Court distinguished the allegations in Fro-
thingham as a challenge to an exercise of spending, but only alleging that it
violated the general separation of powers between the Federal government
and the States'83 and not some other as yet undefined explicit prohibition.
Whether the Constitution contained other specific spending prohibitions was
left for future cases,"8 though the language indicated that the Court was
leaning heavily towards recognizing more "specific" limitations.'85
3. Douglas and a Breach of the Social Contract Suit
Contrary to the distinguishing posture of the majority, Justice Douglas
was the lone justice in favor of discarding the Frothingham rule altogeth-
er.'86 Noting that Frothingham was rendered at the height of the Lochner era
with its forays into substantive due process, Justice Douglas observed that
the Court at that time was coming dangerously close to becoming a "Coun-
cil of Revision."' 87 A contrary holding in Frothingham might well have ac-
centuated an "ominous trend to judicial supremacy. ' Interestingly, Justice
Douglas stated that the Court no longer exercised that kind of power; there-
fore, the risks for the Frothingham Court were no longer present. 89
Praising the work of so-called "private attorneys general" at the state
level, Justice Douglas noted that although a taxpayer's stake may be minim-
al, the service they perform was valuable.' 90 In a statement embracing an
active (as opposed to reactive) judiciary, he stated that the role of the Court
180. Id. at 103.
181. Id.
182. Flast, 392 U.S. at 104.
183. Id. at 104-05.
184. Id. at 105.
185. Contrary to the majority's openness to additional limitations on spending authority,
Justices Stewart and Fortas understood the decision to limit standing only to First Amend-
ment Establishment Clause cases. Id. at 114 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 115 (Fortas, J.,
concurring).
186. Id. at 107 (Douglas, J., concurring).
187. Id.
188. Flast, 392 U.S. at 107.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 109.
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was not merely to serve as referee, but to protect individuals.1 9' The judi-
ciary was the essential component to the operation of the federal system,
particularly in light of the growing complexities of government bureaucra-
cy. 192 "The Constitution even with the judicial gloss it ha[d] acquired plainly
[wa]s not adequate to protect the individual against the growing bureaucracy
in the Legislative and Executive [b]ranches."' 93 The judiciary should, there-
fore, open its doors to such private attorneys general to guard the rights of
individuals against the powers of the government. 194 Because of the good
that such taxpayer standing could accomplish, Justice Douglas would not
have limited such standing to the First Amendment but would have allowed
it in all circumstances to challenge the constitutionality of government ac-
tion.' 95
4. Lone Dissenter-Harlan's Critic
In marked contrast to the rest of the Court, Justice Harlan declined to
breach the Frothingham bar, absent some form of Congressional action.' 96
For Harlan, the core issue presented to the Court was not purely a matter of
abstract judicial rules, but rather, something at the heart of the Court's role
in the constitutional structure. 97 Frothingham, he stated, was correctly de-
cided, but the reasoning was faulty.'9"
The issue was not whether a taxpayer could have standing, but rather,
whether a taxpayer as taxpayer alone could have standing.' 99 Basically, tax-
payer suits were identical to citizen suits.2" Both are public actions brought
to vindicate public rights.20' Justice Harlan believed that the Court correctly
held that Frothingham did not present a constitutional bar to such suits be-
191. Id. at 110.
192. Id. atI 11.
193. Id.
194. Flast, 392 U.S. at 111. Interestingly enough, Justice Douglas's opinion sounded a
very Lockean approach to taxpayer standing. This approach would view the taxpayer's right
to sue as predicated on a breach of the social contract. Because a taxpayer, like all citizens,
was a party to the contract, he would be able to vindicate breaches of the constitution through
suit in federal court. For a further discussion of this idea, see Donald L. Doernberg, "We the
People ": John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Govern-
ment Action, 73 CAL. L. REv. 52 (1985).
195. Flast, 392 U.S. at 114 (Douglas, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 130 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 116.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 117.
200. Id. at 118.
201. Flast, 392 U.S. at 118.
2008]
UALR LAW REVIEW
cause it was clear that Article III was not offended by such suits per se. 2°2
Where he differed was on what to do with such a determination.
Whereas Justice Harlan was willing to accept that a taxpayer as tax-
payer may have sufficient injury to meet the Article III standing require-
ments, he was not willing to allow a broad grant of standing absent explicit
Congressional authorization for such suits.20 3 His approach emphasized the
risks to the separation of powers.2" Because of the extraordinary nature of
public actions, it was Congress's role-not the Court's-to authorize such
suits.2" 5 It would take several years, but later justices would pick up on Har-
lan's concerns, and the Court would move away from this broad acceptance
of taxpayer standing.2"
IV. FLAST OVER TIME: THE GIFT THAT KEEPS ON GIVING
It was not long after Flast was decided that the Court began to cut back
on its broad grant of taxpayer standing. This section will catalogue a series
of cases throughout the Burger, Rehnquist, and early Roberts eras dealing
with Flast and taxpayer standing. First, it will discuss the limitation of Flast
to the Establishment Clause context during the Burger Court and the ever
increasingly formalistic application of the Flast test.20 7 Next, it will note a
single reemergence of Flast during the Rehnquist era.208 It will conclude
with a look at taxpayer standing during the first term of the Roberts Court.2°9
A. The Burger Court
The Burger Court moved quickly to tighten the reins on taxpayer stand-
ing. By 1974, the Court had limited Flast to the Establishment Clause with
two decisions rendered the same day-United States v. Richardson2'0 and
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War.21' Both suits tested the
outer limits of Flast and answered the question left unanswered by the Flast
majority: whether the Court would recognize additional limitations on con-
gressional spending. Eight years later, the Court reassessed the continued
vitality of Flast in the Establishment Clause context. As the Court had done
202. Id. at 120 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 130.
204. See id. at 132.
205. Id. at 130.
206. See infra Part IV.A.
207. See infra Part IV.A.
208. See infra Part IV.B.
209. See infra Part IV.C.
210. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
211. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
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previously, it declined to liberally apply the Flast precedent, prompting
some commentators to declare Flast a dead letter. 2
1. Limiting Flast to the Establishment Clause-United States v. Rich-
ardson and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War
In Richardson, the Court addressed whether a party had standing as a
federal taxpayer when challenging certain public reporting provisions of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 as in violation of Article I, section
9, clause 7 of the Constitution."1 3 In rejecting the party's standing, Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the Court, stated that a violation of the Account-
ing Clause did not fall within the explicit limits on congressional spending
that Flast had required.21 4
The same day as Richardson, the Court also decided Schlesinger. In
Schlesinger, the Court was confronted with whether reservists had standing
either as citizens or as taxpayers to challenge members of Congress who
were also reservists under the Incompatibility Clause.2I" Again Chief Justice
Burger authored an opinion that reaffirmed the traditional bar to citizen suits
from Exparte Levitt and declined to expand Flast to this new context.
216
Discussing the decision in Flast, Chief Justice Burger acknowledged
that it had created an exception to the previously impenetrable holding of
Frothingham; however, that exception was very narrow: when a party falls
outside the narrow exception of Flast the near absolute bar of Frothingham
still governs." 7 Applying Flast's two pronged analysis in Richardson, he
found Richardson failed on both prongs.28 The same was true of the reserv-
ists in Schlesinger. 9 Without establishing the requisite nexus, Richardson
and the reservists' claims were wholly undifferentiated from a claim com-
212. John J. Egan III, Analyzing Taxpayer Standing in Terms of General Standing Prin-
ciples: The Road Not Taken, 63 B.U. L. REv. 717, 741 (1983).
213. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 167-68 (1974). Article I, section 9,
clause 7 provides that: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Ex-
penditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time." UNITED STATES CONST.
Art. I, § 9, cl.7 (emphasis added).
214. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 170.
215. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209 (1974). Article
I, section 6, clause 2 provides that: "No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased
during such time." UNITED STATES CONST. Art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
216. See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 209.
217. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 173.
218. Id. at 174-75.
219. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 228.
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mon to all members of the public2 2 -- a claim that the government abides by
the Constitution.
Discussing citizen suits in Schlesinger, the Chief Justice stated that to
have standing, a party must have a concrete injury.22' This was what citizen
suits lacked.222 A citizen's claim was undifferentiated from interests shared
by all other citizens, thus making the injury mere speculation.2 3 Reaffirming
the traditional rejection of citizen standing from Ex parte Levitt, the Chief
Justice acknowledged that such suits presented merely abstract claims. 24
A concrete personal injury, as required for standing, eliminates specu-
lation by presenting real plaintiffs who are affected by the court's actions
and reducing the risk of abuse by the judiciary.2 5 Critical of expansive citi-
zen standing, the Chief Justice went on to state that abstract citizen com-
plaints created the "potential for abuse of the judicial process" which would
"distort the role of the Judiciary" and lead to "government by injunction.,
226
Standing requirements, therefore, limited the courts to actual controversies
so as not to lead to judicial grandstanding.227
In both cases, the Court acknowledged that if the parties were ultimate-
ly unable to assert their claims, arguably no one would be able to litigate the
matter.228 Nevertheless, the Court stated that the Constitution did not provide
a cause of action in the legal process for every wrong; rather, another me-
chanism--that is, the democratic process-was available to redress the
claim.229 The inability to sue because a party lacked standing did not deny
the plaintiff a remedy; instead, he could pursue the political process, slow
and cumbersome as it may be.230 Alluding to the separation of powers ratio-
nale, the Court noted that granting standing to taxpayers (or citizens) would
have meant the framers created something akin to an "Athenian democracy"
to oversee the conduct of the government by lawsuits in federal courts, and
not a representative government responsible electorally to the public.
23'
Through its holdings in Richardson and Schlesinger, the Court essen-
tially slammed the door on expansive readings of the Flast precedent, and it
seemed that Flast had been limited to the Establishment Clause. It would not
220. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 177; Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 228.
221. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 220.
225. Id. at 221.
226. Id. at 222.
227. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 222.
228. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179; Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 227.
229. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179; Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 227.
230. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179.
231. Id.
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be long, however, before the Court would turn its eye on the heart of the
Flast precedent, revisiting the Establishment Clause.
2. Formalism over Substance: Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.232
Eight years after the Richardson and Schlesinger decisions, the Court
took up an Establishment Clause challenge brought under Flast. Writing for
the majority in Valley Forge, then-Justice Rehnquist addressed whether a
federal taxpayer had standing to challenge Executive Branch action that
allegedly violated the Establishment Clause.233 In a tortured example of rhe-
torical formalism, 234 the Court applied the two pronged test of Flast, holding
that Americans United failed to meet the requisite nexus for taxpayer stand-
ing.
235
In 1949, Congress enacted the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act, which authorized federal agencies to dispose of surplus gov-
ernment property.236 In particular, the Act authorized the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare to dispose of real property for various edu-
cational uses. 237 In 1973, the federal government closed the Valley Forge
General Hospital and declared it "surplus property" under the Act.23 8 Later
that same year, the Secretary conveyed the seventy-seven acre property to
the Valley Forge Christian College (VFCC).239
VFCC was a religious non-profit institution organized under the As-
semblies of God.24° It intended to use the property for the training of men
and women for "Christian service as either ministers or laymen."24' Ameri-
cans United for the Separation of Church and State, Inc. ("Americans Unit-
ed") learned of this conveyance and filed suit in federal district court, chal-
232. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
233. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 470 (1982).
234. For a critical view of the Court's holding and reasoning in Valley Forge, see Gene R.
Nichol, Jr., Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court and Valley Forge, 61 N.C. L.
REv. 798 (1983). For a view supportive of the Court's reasoning, see William P. Marshall &
Maripat Flood, Establishment Clause Standing: The Not Very Revolutionary Decision at
Valley Forge, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 63 (1982).
235. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 482.
236. Id. at 466.
237. Id. at 467.
238. Id. at 467-68.
239. Id. at 468.
240. Id.
241. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 468.
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lenging it under the Establishment Clause.242 The sole basis for standing was
as taxpayers under the Court's earlier decision of Flast.243
Justice Rehnquist began by stating that standing placed constitutional
and prudential limitations on the exercise of federal judicial power.2" Ar-
ticle III required that a plaintiff show some actual or threatened injury,
which is fairly traceable to the challenged action and likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision, ensuring that the courts acted consistent with a sys-
tem of separated powers.245 Prudential concerns also affected standing, such
as the prohibition on third party claims or generalized grievances,246 but
these prudential concerns were not to be confused with the independent re-
quirements of Article Ill.247
The analysis of Americans United's suit necessarily began with the
general ban on taxpayer suits from Frothingham and Doremus.248 Referenc-
ing Flast's abrogatation of this rigid prohibition, Justice Rehnquist noted
that the plaintiff must show that (1) Congress exercised its taxing and spend-
ing power and (2) it did so in violation of a specific prohibition on such
power, that is, the Establishment Clause.249
Americans United failed the first prong of the Flast test for two rea-
sons.25 ' First, Americans United did not even challenge the congressional
enactment at issue, merely discretionary executive action.25 Second, even if
congressional action had been challenged, Congress was acting under the
Property Clause, Article IV, section 3, clause 2, and not the taxing and
spending provisions of Article I, section 8.252
Although Americans United claimed the Constitution had been vi-
olated, they failed to identify any personal injury as a result of this error-
other than mere psychological disagreement.2 53 "[S]tanding [wa]s not meas-
ured by the intensity of the litigant's interest or the fervor of his advoca-
cy. '254 Americans United lacked any cognizable interest, economic or oth-
242. Id. at 469.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 471.
245. Id. at 472.
246. Id. at 474.
247. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475.
248. Id. at 476-77.
249. Id. at 478-79.
250. Id. at 479.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 480. Article IV, section 3, clause 2 provides that: "The Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States." UNITED STATES Const. Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
253. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485.
254. Id. at 486.
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erwise, sufficient to confer standing independent of Flast.2" Judicial power
required more for its invocation than important issues and a willing liti-
gant.
256
Criticism of the majority's rigid formalism came almost immediately,
taking to heart the words of Justice Brennan's biting dissent. 51 Standing for
Justice Brennan was a purely jurisdictional matter that should be determined
prior to any assessment of the substantive issues of a plaintiff's case.258 He
accused the majority of effectively using "standing" to slam the courthouse
door when it should be deciding constitutional issues.259 The Constitution
ensures rights, and Article III was designed to provide a hospitable forum to
assert those rights.26' The framers did not use the modem language of stand-
ing, but they clearly meant that the Constitution's beneficiaries should enjoy
rights legally enforceable in courts of law.26'
According to Justice Brennan, the majority had wrenched Flast from
its moorings, drawing distinctions that were specious at best.262 There was
no distinction between the legislative and executive branches under the Es-
tablishment Clause, and the comparison of "spending clause" versus "prop-
erty clause" distinction was equally irrelevant. 263 For Brennan, the majori-
ty's formalism drew a distinction where one did not logically exist. 26 There
was no reasonable difference between a congressional act giving cash to a
religious group to build a facility and simply giving the group a facility.265
Nevertheless, the majority's decision would draw such a line.
B. The Rehnquist Court-Flast Reborn: Bowen v. Kendrick
266
Six years after Valley Forge, the Court breathed new life into Flast, if
only for a moment.2 67 In Bowen v. Kendrick, the Court faced another taxpay-
er suit presenting an Establishment Clause challenge, this time of a congres-
255. Id.
256. Id. at 489.
257. See, e.g., Nichol, supra note 234.
258. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 490 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 493-94.
261. Id. at 494.
262. Id. at510.
263. Id. at511.
264. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This appeal to logic in the
Court's taxpayer standing jurisprudence would later re-emerge in Justice Scalia's opinion in
Hein, see infra Part V.C.2, albeit coming to the opposite conclusion.
265. Id.
266. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
267. For an article generally discussing the Court's Establishment Clause holding in
Bowen, see Margo R. Drucker, Bowen v. Kendrick: Establishing Chastity at the Expense of
Constitutional Prophylactics, 64 N.Y. L. REv. 1165 (1989).
2008]
UALR LAW REVIEW
sional enactment.268 After years of defeats, Bowen would be one of the few
successful instances in which the Court applied the holding in Flast to grant
taxpayer standing.269
A group of federal taxpayers filed an action in federal district court
challenging the constitutionality of the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA)
under the Establishment Clause.270 When the Court addressed the issue, it
held that the taxpayers in this case possessed standing consistent with the
decision in Flast.27" '
Although the Court reiterated the narrowness of Flast,27 2 this chal-
lenged action was saved because Congress had exercised taxing and spend-
ing power, unlike the Valley Forge decision and despite the existence of
discretionary executive action.27 Somewhat ironically in light of Valley
Forge, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reiterated that it
was no less a challenge to congressional action when the congressional
funds flowed through and were administered by executive agencies whose
specific actions were the alleged violations.274 After all, Flast itself was a
suit directed at a secretary for administering the challenged law.27 5 AFLA
was, at its root, a spending bill, and the First Amendment challenge was
consistent with the rigors of Flast.276 Leaving Flast intact, the Court contin-
ued to the substantive merits of the plaintiff's claim.
C. The Roberts Court-Additional Limits on Flast: DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno
277
Years after the Bowen decision, and after several changes in member-
ship, the Court attacked the issue of taxpayer standing in the 2006 decision
of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno. In a unanimous opinion, the newly
minted Roberts Court, with Chief Justice Roberts authoring the opinion,
held that plaintiffs asserting a Commerce Clause27s claim as state taxpayers
lacked standing in federal court.279
268. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 597 (1988).
269. Id. at 591.
270. Id. at 597.
271. Id. at 619.
272. Id. at 618.
273. Id. at 619.
274. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 619.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 619-20.
277. 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006).
278. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
279. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1865 (2006). In a brief concur-
rence, Justice Ginsburg agreed that the opinion was consistent with the prior holding in Fro-
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The city of Toledo and State of Ohio sought to encourage Daimler-
Chrysler to expand its Jeep production facilities in Ohio.280 To do so, the
State offered various tax breaks and tax incentives to DaimlerChrysler. 28 ' A
group of Ohio taxpayers challenged those credits as violations of the Com-
merce Clause.282
In an opinion expected to be a major dormant Commerce Clause chal-
lenge,283 the Court sidestepped the substantive issues of the case, focusing
on the matter of standing.284 Noting the important separation of powers func-
tion served by standing, Chief Justice Roberts began by stating that standing
was an essential limit of federal jurisdiction and necessary to maintain the
proper division of power among the branches of the federal government.
285
This case called into question the Court's prior taxpayer standing cases, and
it was there that the new Chief began his opinion.2 6
The Court repeatedly held that a federal plaintiff s claim to standing by
virtue of his taxpayer status did not establish standing under Article 111.287
Frothingham made it clear that a federal taxpayer's interest in the moneys of
the treasury was "comparatively minute and indeterminable" as well as "re-
mote, fluctuating, and uncertain., 288 The injury sustained as a taxpayer was
not concrete and particularized, but instead a grievance that a taxpayer suf-
fered in some indefinite way common to people generally.289 This rationale
applied equally to federal and state taxpayer suits that made their way into
federal court29 -- something to which the Doremus decision had previously
alluded.29' The Chief Justice stated that affording State taxpayers such stand-
ing would interpose the federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the
wisdom and soundness of State fiscal administration.292 Such a role was
inconsistent with the modest role of the judiciary envisioned in Article 111.293
thingham, yet refused to endorse the additional limitations on standing found by the Court.
Cuno, 126 S. Ct. at 1869 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
280. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. at 1859.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Sue Ann Mota, DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno-Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Challenge
State Franchise Tax Credit in Federal Court, According to the Supreme Court, 29 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 66, 66 (2006).
284. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854.
285. Id. at 1861.
286. Id. at 1860.
287. Id. at 1862 (quoting Mass. v. Melton, 262 U.S. 447,486-87 (1923)).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Cuno, 126 at 1863.
291. See supra Part III.C.




The plaintiff attempted to rely on the narrow exception of Flast, claim-
ing that a Commerce Clause challenge was just as vital as the Establishment
Clause.294 This argument fell on deaf ears as the Chief Justice noted that
whatever the interest an individual had in the Commerce Clause, it was quite
different from the right not to contribute three pence for support of any reli-
gious establishment.295 The Court in Flast understood the injury to the Es-
tablishment Clause to be the very extraction and spending of tax money in
aid of religion, extending that to the Commerce Clause would be at odds
with the narrowness of Flast, making the federal courts fora for a taxpayer's
generalized grievances.296 Such a decision would be inconsistent with both
federalism and separation of powers as well as beyond the narrow limits of
the Flast holding.297
V. Is FLAST DEAD, YET-HEIN v. FREEDOMFROMRELIGIONFOUNDATION,
INC.
After thirty-nine years of Flast--confusion, tumult, and all-the Ro-
berts Court took another shot at the issue of taxpayer standing in Hein v.
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. 298 In this case, the Court had a
chance to provide clarity and coherence to an area of law sorely lacking in
both regards. Instead, the Court left things just as murky as when they be-
gan-an area governed more by the rule of five than the rule of law and
logic.
This section will catalogue Hein's journey from the White House office
of Faith Based Initiatives to the Supreme Court. It will begin with the facts
of the case,29 followed by a discussion of Judge Richard Posner's Seventh
Circuit decision.3" Next, it will discuss the Supreme Court's decision.3 '
This section will cover the plurality's opinion written by Justice Samuel
Alito30 2 and Justice Scalia's scathing concurrence.30 3 It will conclude with a
word on Justice Souter's dissent.3 °
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1865.
297. Id.
298. 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
299. See infra Part V.A.
300. See infra Part V.B.
301. See infra Part V.C.
302. See infra Part V.C. 1.
303. See infra Part V.C.2.
304. See infra Part V.C.3.
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A. Facts and Legal Fiction
In 2001, President Bush issued an executive order creating the White
House Office of Faith-Based Initiatives.35 The initiative aimed at helping
religious organizations take advantage of federal financial assistance pro-
grams for social services.3° In many respects, it amounted to several semi-
nars and conferences held for religious groups on the application process for
federal funds, and it sought to put these groups on equal footing with other
secular organizations.0 7 No congressional legislation authorized the creation
of this office or specifically appropriated moneys for these activities." 8 Bush
created the office entirely within the executive branch.3"
The plaintiffs were members of a non-stock corporation opposed to
government endorsement of religion known as the Freedom from Religion
Foundation.310 They filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin, alleging that the conferences violated the
Establishment Clause.3 ' The fact that the Plaintiffs were federal taxpayers
was the only asserted basis of standing." 2 The district court dismissed the
suit for want of standing under the Supreme Court's decision in Flast.
31 3
Shortly thereafter, the matter came before the Seventh Circuit on appeal.
B. Posner Gets First Crack at It
Judges Richard Posner, Kenneth Ripple, and Diane Wood comprised a
three judge panel that faced the question of whether a taxpayer could ever
have standing under Article III to litigate an alleged violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause unless Congress had earmarked money for the program or
activity challenged.31 4 Writing for the majority, Judge Posner held that tax-
payers have standing to challenge an executive branch program, alleged to
promote religion that is financed by a congressional appropriation, even if
305. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559 (2007)
(plurality opinion).
306. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2559 (plurality opinion).
307. Id. at 2559-60.




312. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2561 (plurality opinion).
313. Id.
314. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 990 (7th Cir. 2006)
rev'd sub nom. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007). For an
initial reaction to the Chao decision, see Debra L. Lowman, A Call for Judicial Restraint:




the program is created entirely within the executive branch, by an executive
order.3"5 Judge Ripple dissented, stating that the court went beyond estab-
lished Supreme Court precedent in order to create a dramatic expansion of
taxpayer standing.316
Judge Posner began with the Court's decision in Flast.317 That Court
noted that standing doctrine was comprised of both constitutional and pru-
dential considerations.318 Prudential considerations, such as the ban on gene-
ralized grievances, did not stand in the way of challenges to congressional
expenditures under the taxing and spending clause of Article I, section 8, at
least as it related to favoritism or aid to religion.319 Although Valley Forge
limited the holding in Flast, the essential premise that taxpayers had stand-
ing to challenge congressional action under Article 1, section 8, in violation
of the Establishment Clause, remained.'
The Bowen decision followed a narrow reading of Flast as not requir-
ing taxpayers to show that a specific ongressional expenditure violates the
Establishment clause, but that the congressional action under Article I, sec-
tion 8, was necessary for the violation to occur.32' In that way, so long as the
allegedly unconstitutional action, even if committed by the executive, flows
from a congressional exercise of the Tax and Spend Clause, the taxpayer
had standing under Flast.322 According to Posner, the difference between
explicit congressional funding of a program and general appropriation could
not possibly be controlling. 323 Because congressional appropriations funded
the challenged executive action in this case, the plaintiffs established suffi-
cient standing to maintain their suit.
3 24
Penning a stirring dissent, Judge Ripple chastised the majority for its
flippant disregard of Supreme Court precedent.3 25 He stated that the majority
had gone far beyond established Supreme Court precedent in order to create
a dramatic expansion of taxpayer standing.3 26 Taxpayer standing pushed the
envelope of traditional standing doctrine, and so it was with great hesitation
that the Supreme Court had allowed any taxpayer standing suits.327 Flast
created a narrow exception, which had been limited to its facts since its in-
315. Chao, 433 F.3d at 996-97.
316. Id. at 997 (Ripple, J., dissenting).




321. Chao, 433 F.3d at 993.
322. Id.
323. Id.at 994.
324. Id. at 996-97.
325. Id. at 997 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
326. Id.
327. Choa, 447 F.3d at 997 (Ripple J. dissenting).
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ception.328 The action in question here was not congressional action in the
strictest sense, but rather executive discretion.329 The majority's decision
expanded the narrow concept of taxpayer standing to the point where it
could not logically be distinguished from citizen standing-long decried by
the Court.
330
After the panel rendered its decision, the whole Seventh Circuit de-
cided whether to grant en banc review of the case. In denying review, Chief
Judge Joel Flaum penned a brief concurrence denying review, not necessari-
ly because the opinion was correct, but because the law was so unclear."' In
his estimation, the case was ripe for the Supreme Court to step in and re-
solve the obvious tension engendered by prior Court decisions.332 Similarly,
Judge Frank Easterbrook noted that his vote to deny rehearing was not based
on the accuracy of the panel's decision.333 The principal difficulty was that
the decisions on taxpayer standing were so arbitrary-put plainly, where is
the concrete issue?.3 . Arbitrariness was built into the doctrine, and it was not
for the Seventh Circuit to resolve. 335 Noting the futility of further review,
Judge Easterbrook stated that there was no logical way to determine the
extent of an arbitrary rule.336
C. The Supreme Court Wades into the Confusion
In late February 2007, the Court heard oral arguments in Hein v. Free-
dom from Religion, Inc. Months later, in one of the last opinions rendered
during the 2006-07 term, the Court delivered a sharply divided-and sharp-
ly worded-opinion denying standing and reversing the Seventh Circuit's
panel decision. Justice Alito wrote the plurality opinion for himself, Justice
Kennedy, and Chief Justice Roberts.337 Concurring in the plurality's result
but disputing its reasoning, Justice Scalia wrote a blunt critique, which Jus-
tice Thomas joined.33' Although the justices denying standing highlighted
the very real differences in their respective jurisprudence, the dissenting
justices evidenced doctrinal unanimity, signing onto a single opinion written
by Justice Souter. 339 The following section dissects the various Hein opi-
328. Id. at 998.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 1000.
331. Id. at 988 (Flaum, C.J., concurring).
332. Id. at 988.
333. Choa, 447 F.3d at 989 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
334. Id.
335. Id. at 990.
336. Id.
337. See infra at Part V.C.1.
338. See infra at Part V.C.2.
339. See infra at V.C.3.
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nions, beginning with Justice Alito's plurality. It will cover Justice Scalia's
lengthy concurrence and conclude with a look into Justice Souter's dissent.
1. The Plurality-Minimalist Ascendancy
Beginning with language reminiscent of Frothingham and Marbury,
Justice Alito stated that the federal courts are not empowered to seek out and
strike down any governmental act that they deem repugnant to the Constitu-
tion.3" Rather, federal courts sit solely to determine the rights of individu-
als.34' Justice Alito added that as a general matter, the interest of a federal
taxpayer in seeing that Treasury funds are spent in accordance with the Con-
stitution does not give rise to the kind of redressable personal injury re-
quired by Article 111.342 Over time, the Court has consistently held that this
interest is too generalized and attenuated.34 3 Judge Alito went on to note that
the interests of a taxpayer are, in essence, the interests of the public-at-large.
Deciding a constitutional claim based solely on taxpayer standing would not
resolve a judicial controversy but instead would assume power over the oth-
er branches, a power the courts do not possess."
Turning to Flast, Justice Alito stated that the decision carved out a nar-
row exception to the general bar on taxpayer suits.345 Justice Alito distin-
guished Hein from Flast by stating that Flast dealt with expenditures pur-
suant to an express congressional mandate and appropriation.' As the
Court noted in Valley Forge, Flast was limited to exercises of congressional
authority--not executive action.347 Unlike Flast, the plaintiffs here did not
challenge congressional appropriation.3 4' The expenditures were the result of
pure executive discretion. 349 Because the expenditures were not expressly
authorized or mandated by any specific congressional enactment, the plain-
tiffs failed to qualify for taxpayer standing under Flast.35
Flast, as precedent, was limited to congressional actions, and the plu-
rality declined the invitation to extend its holding to discretionary executive
action despite the clear Establishment Clause implications. 5 Justice Alito
340. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2562 (plurality
opinion).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 2563.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 2564.
346. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2565 (plurality opinion).
347. Id. at 2566.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 2568.
351. Id.
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noted that even Flast distinguished "incidental expenditures of tax funds in
the administration of an essentially regulatory statute" from the Congres-
sional expenditures.352 Furthermore, in the four decades that followed, the
Flast decision had yet to be extended beyond its facts.353 To extend it to ex-
ecutive activity would subject every federal action to an Establishment
Clause challenge in federal court.5 Such a broad reading would ignore the
requirement of Flast's first prong, as well as raise serious separation of
powers issues.355
Critical of Flast, Justice Alito believed that it failed to give sufficient
weight to separation of powers concerns raised by any grant of taxpayer
standing.35 6 Constitutional requirements for standing played an essential role
in the separation of powers.357 Relaxation of those requirements would fun-
damentally alter the inter-branch relationships-a major shift away from
democratic governance.35 s It was not the role of the courts to be continuous
monitors of the soundness of executive actions and to "govern[] by injunc-
tion. 359
Declining to engage in a wholesale reexamination of Flast, Justice Ali-
to deferred to the principle of stare decisis, which, short of overruling
precedent, does not always require such precedent be extended to the limit
of its logic. 3 ° The plurality declined to extend Flast to this circumstance, yet
at the same time declined to overrule it.36' The plurality left Flast as they
found it and decided only the case at hand: whether or not Flast should be
extended.362
2. Scalia's Concurrence-Logic and the Soul of the Law
Coming out swinging, Justice Scalia began by stating that Flast is
"wholly irreconcilable with the Article III restrictions on federal-court juris-
352. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568 (plurality opinion).
353. Id. at 2568-69.
354. Id. at 2569.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 2570.
358. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2570 (plurality opinion).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 2571.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 2571-72. Justice Kennedy wrote a brief concurrence to highlight that he was
not willing to disassemble the Flast framework. Id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring). For
Justice Kennedy, Flast struck the proper balance between separation of powers concerns and
the important interests unique to the Establishment clause. Id. Nonetheless, he chided gov-
ernment officials that they must always make a conscious effort to act constitutionally; even
if they were not subject to lawsuits. Id. at 2573.
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diction. 363 Flast and other taxpayer-standing cases have been notoriously
inconsistent, mostly because the Court has alternately relied on two different
types of injury to satisfy the "injury in fact" requirement of Article III: "wal-
let injury" and "psychic injury.
',
31
"Wallet injury" refers to "the type of concrete and particularized injury
one would expect to be asserted in a taxpayer suit, namely, a claim that the
plaintiffs tax liability [wa]s higher than it would be, but for the allegedly
unlawful government action. "365 "Psychic injury," on the other hand, has
nothing to do with tax liability, and instead consists of "the taxpayer's men-
tal displeasure that money extracted from him is being spent in an unlawful
manner." 366 Flast and the cases following it invoked a peculiarly restricted
version of psychic injury in specific instances. 367 This type of injury, howev-
er, conflicts with the familiar requirements of concrete and particularized
injury that distinguish an actual injury from a generalized grievance. 36' The
cases are no less clear because "wallet injury" was denied in the early cases
as insufficient, whereas Flast's limited "psychic injury" was allowed.369 This
logical contradiction has never been resolved to show why "psychic injury"
was cognizable, although a "wallet injury" was not.370
Discussing two pre-Flast cases, Frothingham and Doremus, Justice
Scalia illustrated the problem with "wallet injury" in taxpayer suits. 37 1 In
Frothingham, the Court held the taxpayer lacked standing because the effect
on future taxation was remote and fluctuating.3 72 That Court had referred to
traceability and redressability problems associated with such an injury, those
suffered in some indefinite way in common with the people generally.
373
Doremus, another pre-Flast case, denied taxpayer standing in an Establish-
ment Clause case for much the same reason as Frothingham.374 The plain-
tiffs did not seek to litigate a "dollars-and-cents injury, but rather, a religious
difference. 3 75 Both cases rejected "psychic injury" in unmistakable terms,
in addition to their rejection of most types of "wallet injury.,
376
363. Id. at 2574 (Scalia, J., concurring).
364. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2574.
365. Id.
366. Id. (emphasis original).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 2574-75.






376. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2575.
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Sixteen years after Doremus, the Court decided Flast. For Justice Sca-
lia, the two-prong test it developed could not have been based on "wallet
injury" because its plaintiffs were no better able to prove the money loss
than those in Frothingham.377 Flast relied on "psychic injury" for stand-
ing.378 This logic can only constitute a cognizable injury because of the
"magical two-pronged nexus test," though it has been repeatedly pointed out
that the "criteria... are entirely unrelated to the purported goal of ensuring
the plaintiff has a sufficient 'stake in the outcome of the controversy.'"'79 He
noted that each prong existed solely to distinguish the cases of Doremus and
Frothingham.80
Later cases such as Valley Forge were similarly incoherent.381 Justice
Scalia, channeling the late Justice Brennan, could not fathom "why Article
III standing should turn on whether the government enables a religious or-
ganization to obtain real estate by giving it a check drawn from general tax
revenues or instead by buying the property itself and then transferring
title. 382 The Court in Valley Forge rejected "psychic injury," yet did not
explain why Flast should remain.383
In Bowen, the Court resuscitated Flast, again relying on essentially
"psychic injury" within the formalism of the Flast framework, yet revealing
just how at odds the holding was with Doremus.3 84 To Justice Scalia, Flast
and Bowen's acceptance of "psychic injury" was directly at odds with the
Court's other holdings to the contrary in Frothingham, Doremus, and Valley
Forge."5 After Cuno, the Court was left with two logical choices to the fol-
lowing question: Is "psychic injury" consistent with Article III? If the an-
swer is yes, Flast should extend to all government expenditures in violation
of the Constitution; if not, Flast should be overruled.3 86 Unfortunately, ac-
cording to Justice Scalia, the plurality did not follow either principled op-
tion.387
To Justice Scalia, the plurality provided no intellectual justification for
its holding except that stare decisis did not always require a precedent to be
expanded to the limit of its logic.3 88 Although true as far as it goes, because
"courts purport to be engaged in reasoned decision-making, it is only true
377. Id. at 2576.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 2576-77 (emphasis original).
380. Id. at 2577.
381. Id. at 2577.
382. Hein, 127 S. Ct at 2578.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 2579.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 2579.
388. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2579.
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when" the precedent's logic requires narrowing or the logic is fundamental-
ly flawed and should be limited to its facts.389 Neither justification was
present in the plurality's opinion.39° Flast was "indistinguishable" from the
present case for purposes of Article Ill-whether the expenditure is explicit-
ly allocated by specific congressional enactment "has absolutely no relev-
ance to the Article III criteria" for standing.39" ' The plurality failed to ac-
knowledge that the logic of Flast (sufficiency of "psychic injury") was
wrong, and "for that reason should not be extended to other cases. '392 In-
stead the plurality adopted the express-allocation test, a test that had no
mooring to the Article III requirements for standing.393
Striking at the heart of the plurality's perceived motivations; Justice
Scalia chastised their pose of minimalism. 394 Justice Scalia shared the dis-
sent's bewilderment that executive discretion could be distinguished from
congressional discretion when taxpayer funds were spent on an unconstitu-
tional purpose.395
Furthering his critique on the plurality's minimalism, Justice Scalia
stated as follows: "Minimalism is an admirable judicial trait, but not when it
comes at the cost of meaningless and disingenuous distinctions in the future.
The rule of law is ill served by forcing lawyers and judges to make argu-
ments that deaden the soul of the law, which is logic and reason., 396 He went
on to say that either Flast was correct and must apply to every expenditure,
or it was incorrect and must be abandoned.397
Although critical of the plurality's opinion, Justice Scalia was also crit-
ical of Freedom from Religion's position on expansive taxpayer standing.398
Its position logically required every expenditure alleged to violate the Estab-
lishment Clause to be subject to suit under Flast, though to do so ran con-
trary to the explicit denial in Doremus.399 Such broad standing would allow
roving bands of ideologically motivated taxpayers to search for governmen-
tal wrongdoing and reveal it in federal court-transforming the federal
courts into "ombudsmen of the general welfare" with respect to Establish-
ment clause issues.4°
389. Id. (emphasis original).
390. Id.
391. Id. at 2580 (emphasis original).
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2580.
395. Id. at 2581.
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Finally, turning to the sufficiency of Flast's "psychic injury" under Ar-
ticle III, Justice Scalia looked to the Court's prior precedents in Lujan, Fro-
thingham, Ex parte Levitt, Richardson, and Schlesinger-all of which dealt
with generalized grievances.4"' Noting that the Court had occasionally called
it a "prudential bar," he pointed to Lujan and other decisions, which un-
animously held that a suit alleging only generalized grievances failed to
meet the Article III requirement for an injury in fact to be concrete and par-
ticularized." 2 A taxpayer seeks relief that no more directly and tangibly ben-
efits him than the public at large.40 3 Flast relied on the slim reed of Madi-
son's Remonstrance for the special treatment of the Establishment clause,
but that novel claim of purely "psychic injury" was undermined by the
Court's precedence. 4 4
Furthermore, Scalia believed that Flast was incorrect because it expli-
citly and erroneously disregarded the separation of powers function served
by the standing doctrine. 4°5 Flast's judge-empowering understanding of the
role Article III standing plays in preserving separated powers has been repu-
diated as leading to the arguable charge of "government by injunction.
40 6
Applying proper Article III analysis in light of separation of powers, Flast's
general notion of "psychic injury" is revealed as a contradiction of the basic
function of the judiciary, which "is, solely, to decide on the rights of indi-
viduals. '4 7 Those with generalized grievances affecting the public at large
have their remedy: the political process.40 8
Referring to the en banc decision by the Seventh Circuit, Justice Scalia
highlighted that well-respected lower court judges found the Court's prior
cases so lawless that even they saw no point in second-guessing the panel
decision.4' Flast's lack of logical theoretical underpinnings rendered the
taxpayer-standing doctrine a jurisprudential disaster.41" There was no re-
liance interest engendered here, not only because one does not arrange his
affairs around standing, but also because there is no relying on the random
and irrational.41 ' Fewer cases warrant less stare decisis respect, and so Jus-
tice Scalia stated that Flast should be overruled.41 2
401. Id. at 2582.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 2583.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2583.
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3. Souter's Dissent-Is that You Justice Brennan?
Penning a dissent for himself, Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer,
Justice Souter would have found standing under the Flast analysis.4"3 Flast
held that plaintiffs with an Establishment Clause claim could demonstrate
the necessary stake as taxpayers to satisfy Article III requirements.41 4 The
injury for an alleged violation of the Establishment Clause was the very
extracting and spending of tax money in aid of religion.415 This injury was
quite real and has deep historical roots in the purpose of the Establishment
Clause.416 As Madison noted in his Remonstrance, government in a free so-
ciety may not force a citizen to contribute three pence to the support of any
one establishment of religion.41 7 For the dissent, this was not mere disa-
greement or "psychic injury" as Justice Scalia claimed; there was a personal
constitutional right not to be taxed for the support of religious institutions.4 8
Contrary to the plurality, the parties here did not seek to extend Flast,
but merely to apply it.419 Executive agencies can spend unconstitutionally
just as easily as Congress such that the injury is indistinguishable.42 ° If the
Executive could accomplish through the exercise of discretion exactly what
Congress cannot through legislation, the Establishment Clause protections
would melt away.42' Put mildly, the distinction between congressional
mandate and executive discretion in spending is arbitrary.422
Justice Souter went on, noting that cognizable harm takes into account
the nature of the interest protected, not merely injury of the flesh or purse.423
Injuries have been found sufficient for other non-monetary, non-physical
harms, such as esthetic harms, uneven competition on the basis of race
without showing of loss, and even living in racially gerrymandered dis-
tricts.424 This is not to say that any sort of alleged injury will suffice, but it
dispels the notion that only physical or monetary injuries are permitted.425
Flast merely recognized a special injury unique to taxpayers in Establish-
ment Clause cases in light of the history and purpose of that constitutional
413. Id. at 2584 (Souter, J., dissenting).
414. Id. at 2585.
415. Id. at 2584-85.
416. Id. at2585.
417. Id.
418. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2585.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 2586.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 2587.
424. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2587.
425. Id.
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protection.426 Because the taxpayers here alleged such an injury, they met
the test for standing-contrary to assertions by Justices Alito and Scalia.427
VI. COMMENTARY-THE LANDSCAPE AFTER HEIN
The legal landscape after Hein is much the same as it was before: in-
consistent, formalistic, and unhelpful for lower court application. The fol-
lowing section will offer a critique of the Hein decision as well as an outline
of its possible and probable impact on taxpayer suits. This section will high-
light the consistent inconsistency of the Court's taxpayer jurisprudence,
noting examples of both pre- and post-Hein confusion among the lower
courts.428 Specifically, it takes issue with the Court for wasting an opportuni-
ty to provide clarity and guidance in an area desperately in need of both.429
Finally, it concludes with a recommendation that the Court return to a rea-
soned standing analysis in light of the first principles and the underlying
purposes of the standing doctrine by bringing taxpayer standing inline with
constitutional standing principles.43°
A. Doublespeak
Less than a month after Hein, it was clear that the status quo remained
firmly intact. Judge DeMoss of the Fifth Circuit said it best: "[t]he Supreme
Court cannot continue to speak out of both sides of its mouth if it intends to
provide real guidance to federal courts on this issue. ' 43 Judge DeMoss's
post-Hein critique mirrored that of Judge Easterbrook's dilemma with the
Court in Chao. Not much had changed in that regard.432
Before the Hein decision, nearly every circuit had addressed the di-
lemma created by Flast and Doremus, particularly in light of the restrictions
placed on Flast by Valley Forge. For example, both the First and the Ninth
Circuits noted the restrictive view of taxpayer standing that emerged from
Valley Forge, yet both circuits realized that in many ways Flast was still
intact.433 The bigger concern that both courts left unaddressed was the ten-
sion created between post-Flast case law and the pre-Flast consensus, most
notably Doremus. The reasoning of those two decisions seemed patently at
426. Id. at 2587-88.
427. Id. at 2588.
428. See infra Part VI.A.
429. See infra Part VI.B.
430. See infra Part VI.C.
431. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(DeMoss, J., concurring).
432. See supra Part V.B.
433. See Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029, 1030-31 (1st Cir. 1982); Doe v. Madison
School Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1999).
2008)
UALR LAW REVIEW
odds, but the courts were content to distinguish the two because Doremus
dealt with state, rather than federal, taxpayers.4 34 Nevertheless, those courts
and the Hein plurality did not address those conceptual and theoretical dif-
ferences.
Other circuits had acknowledged the shift in taxpayer standing caused
by the Flast line of cases but were unsure what to make of it. The Second
Circuit noted the "complex[ity]" of the test from Flast but, at least in one
instance, decided to pursue normal standing analysis, rather than get in-
volved in the minutiae.435 The Sixth Circuit stated that Flast had influenced
all federal taxpayer suits, but just how much impact the decision had was
not stated.436 At the very least, it was a shadow jurisprudence behind the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts' marked developments of normal constitution-
al standing.
4 37
In light of the doctrinal inconsistency between Flast and its predeces-
sors, and the uncertainty remaining after Valley Forge, the circuits respond-
ed more and more in the formalistic fashion that the Hein plurality exhi-
bited. Following the Supreme Court's guidance in Valley Forge, the Eighth
Circuit declined to expand Flast's reach to Free Exercise Clause taxpayer
suits, strictly applying the two-pronged analysis.438 The Tenth Circuit chas-
tised plaintiffs for relying on Flast as a broad license for taxpayer suits,439
despite the language to the contrary found in the Flast opinion itself." Over
and over, circuits took an increasingly formalistic and narrow approach to
the Flast jurisprudence, although occasionally, as the Ninth Circuit showed,
a plaintiff could meet the burden despite a nominal injury." 1
In many ways, the circuit courts were following the lead of the Su-
preme Court, which practically eviscerated Flast in its infancy, all the while
implicitly stating its holding was sacrosanct. 4 2 With Valley Forge as the
most obvious example of judicial formalism, it was no wonder the circuits
were willing to apply the letter of Flast, but not its spirit. The closest any
circuit came to applying Flast creatively and consistent with its reasoning
434. See, e.g., Madison School, 177 F.3d at 796.
435. United States v. City of New York, 972 F.2d 464, 471 (2d Cir. 1992).
436. Taub v. Kentucky, 842 F.2d 912,916 (6th Cir. 1988).
437. Compare supra Part II.B.4-5 to supra Part IV.A-C.
438. Tarsney v. O'Keefe, 225 F.3d 929, 934-35 (8th Cir. 2000); see also Richard M.
Elias, Note, Confusion in the Realm of Taxpayer Standing: The State of State Taxpayer
Standing in the Eighth Circuit, 66 Mo. L. REv. 413 (2001).
439. Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and State v. Denver, 628 F.2d 1289,
1299 (10th Cir. 1980).
440. See supra Part III.D.2.b.
441. Kong v. Scully, w2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26862, *13 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 2003).
442. See supra Part IV.
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was Judge Posner's opinion in Chao,4" which was subsequently reversed by
Hein.
Because the Hein plurality took much the same tact as Justice Rehn-
quist had in Valley Forge, we can expect similar results in the foreseeable
future. The plurality's minimalism continues the timid, mathematical ap-
proach to taxpayer suits started by the Burger Court. Despite sapping this
area of law of its strength, the plurality stubbornly refused to re-examine the
principle holding of Flast, thus perpetuating a jurisprudence that flies in the
face of ordinary standing rules.4' The plurality failed to address the funda-
mental inconsistency in its standing jurisprudence: Why must taxpayer suits
in the Establishment Clause context play by different rules? The Court has
yet to reconcile its divergent approaches. Hein presented an opportunity to
do just that, but the Court wasted its chance and failed to apply the lessons
learned in Lujan.
In such a muddled environment-with conflicting doctrines and incon-
sistent, some might say irrational, results at every turn-it is no wonder
lower courts have thrown their hands up in dismay."' Specious distinctions
built on exceptions, without some solid constitutional grounding, wreak
havoc on a judicial system striving for consistency and the rule of law. The
problem is not so much what the Court did in Hein, but what it failed to do.
B. Critical of the Hein Plurality
As Judge DeMoss indicated, there is a tension in the Court's Estab-
lishment Clause taxpayer standing jurisprudence." 6 On the one hand, the
Court has stated that standing requirements are just as rigid in Establishment
Clause suits as all others." 7 There is no hierarchy of constitutional rights.448
On the other hand, the Court has allowed standing in Establishment Clause
cases despite the lack of any cognizable injury sufficient to meet the ordi-
nary constitutional requirements, all thanks to the magical Flast test.449 Crit-
ics can rightly find fault with a Court whose jurisprudence says Establish-
ment Clause suits are treated the same as others, while in the same breath
espousing a unique standing test that only applies in the Establishment
443. See supra Part V.B.
444. Compare Flast's two-pronged analysis to the three-part standing test of Lujan.
445. See, e.g., Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 2007) (en
banc) (DeMoss, J., concurring).
446. Id.
447. Id. at 16.
448. Id. (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. V. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,489 (1982)).
449. Id. at 16-17.
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Clause context. This form of doublespeak was only further compounded by
the splintered Hein decision that avoided the issue altogether.
In its opinion, the plurality masterfully laid a groundwork that categor-
ically undermined all attempted taxpayer suits. Citing concerns with the
separation of powers and the problems associated with generalized griev-
ances, the plurality seemed poised to finally rid itself of Flast.45° But, when
the moment came, the plurality retreated, passing the buck on to a later
Court.45 As Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence, the culprit was its pose
of minimalism.452
Minimalism is generally a positive judicial trait, removing speculation
and conjecture by limiting decisions only to those matters at hand. Minimal-
ism is not some unqualified good, however, and it all too often leads a court
to turn a blind eye to pressing concerns even where they are wrapped up in a
decision before it. It is of this principle flaw that the plurality was guilty. By
failing to re-examine Flast, the plurality's minimalism resorted to making
distinctions where none existed between executive and legislative action,
effectively overruling a precedent by subterfuge. The plurality allowed Flast
to continue its existence, while effectively eliminating any chance that it
may be successfully applied to so-called "executive" actions.
As mentioned above, the plurality failed to address the hard question of
Flast's continued vitality in light of modern developments in the constitu-
tional doctrine of standing.453 Instead the plurality drew a line in the sand-
effectively, though likely temporarily, insulating Flast from harm without
acknowledging the tension such a decision engenders. It was a triumph for a
failed status quo, and as mentioned above, will no doubt compound and
continue the frustration of lower courts.454
C. Recommendation: Returning to the Constitutional Principles of Stand-
ing
So what is the Court to do?455 The simple answer is to apply the same
rules to taxpayer suits in the Establishment Clause context as the Court
would apply in ordinary standing analysis. Although this answer may appear
simplistic, it is the only rational way to address this blight on the Court's
jurisprudence. Either standing rules are constitutional in origin and should
450. See supra Part V.C. 1.
451. See supra Part V.C. 1.
452. See supra Part V.C.2.
453. Consider supra Part II.B.5.
454. See, e.g., Tangipahoa, 494 F.3d at 500 (DeMoss, J., concurring).
455. For an initial reaction to the Court's holding in Hein, see Robert Corn-Revere, Fede-
ralism and Separation of Powers: Narrow Issue of Taxpayer Standing Highlights Wide Divi-
sions Among the Justices, 2006-07 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 215 (2007).
[Vol. 30
STANDING IN THE WAY OF CLARITY
apply to all suits, or the rules merely serve as guideposts, while the true rule
of law is the rule of five. To consider why returning taxpayer suits to some
semblance of constitutional analysis is important, consider the underlying
purposes of standing doctrine generally.
Several constitutional and prudential concerns favor standing require-
ments. Among these, the two most important depend on the unique characte-
ristics of the judicial branch and its overall role in a constitutional scheme of
separated powers. The following sections will discuss those qualities of the
judiciary that make standing all the more necessary, as well as the important
considerations served by such requirements.456 It will then highlight the se-
paration of powers function served by standing doctrine.457
1. Unique Characteristics of the Federal Judiciary
The Federal Judiciary is unique among the three branches of govern-
ment in that it is an entirely "reactive" branch.45 Unlike the Legislative and
Executive branches, that can proactively address pressing national issues at
the whim of a democratic electorate, the Judiciary deals with matters in the
past-it determines fault, produces remedies, and adjudicates rights already
violated. The federal courts do not confront issues before they emerge and
likewise are not subject to the same democratic limitations as the other
branches. In a special way, the courts serve as the least threatening branch
because they do not actively seek out litigation to redress all societal ills.
Whereas the democratic branches deal with constituencies, the courts deal
with cases, parties, and individuals. The reactive nature of the judiciary
counsels hesitation in hearing cases without an adequate background, and it
is here that standing doctrine becomes the most pertinent.
Unlike Congress, courts cannot conduct extensive hearings and impa-
nel magistrates to investigate the various questions that may arise in the
course of litigation.459 The courts rely on the parties as the movers and shak-
ers. In our adversarial system, the parties bring to court their issues, their
facts, and their grievances. The court in response addresses those suits and
"judges" the merits of the respective claims. Because the investigation is left
to the parties in any given case, it is essential to the interests of judicial
economy that the proper parties be present before the court. Otherwise the
456. See infra Part VI.C.1.
457. See infra Part VI.C.2.
458. For a general discussion about the unique characteristics of the judiciary, particularly
as it relates to standing doctrine, see Steven D. Smith, Courts, Creativity, and the Duty to
Decide a Case, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 573 (1985). For an academic overview of the judicial
role, note MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS,
AND QUESTIONS, 17-69 (Thomson-West, 6th Ed. 2007).
459. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 57-59 (4th ed. 2003).
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distinction between judicial and legislative advocacy becomes so blurred as
to be nonexistent.
Proper parties present a concrete factual circumstance where legal is-
sues become most real. The constitutional or statutory issues are not theoret-
ical, but factual. They have a face, a name, and a story. It is in this situation
that the judiciary is most at home: judging the rights of individuals who
have suffered some injury. In this way, rather than ideological partisans,
personally invested litigants-those with a personal stake in the outcome-
take advantage of the judicial forum. Should matters become reversed, the
courts would cease to be fora for the resolution of individual conflicts and
become yet another avenue for political posturing. In doing so, the weight of
an overbearing judicial oligarchy would crush the principles of democratic
sovereignty. Roving bands of ideologically motivated partisans could use
the court as a tool to achieve their aims outside the democratic process and
outside democratic accountability. Although Publius noted the judiciary is
the least dangerous branch,'6O such a moniker is easily lost once the courts
cease to be "courts of law" and become patently political actors. This cau-
tion spills over into concerns with the separation of powers.
2. The Separation of Powers Doctrine
In a landmark article on standing and the judiciary, then-Judge Antonin
Scalia stated that standing doctrine was an essential component to the Sepa-
ration of Powers doctrine."6' More than any other justiciability doctrine,462
standing is crucial to prevent the over-judicialization of the processes of
self-governance6 3 There is a core constitutional element of standing, which
not even Congress can eliminate, that is inextricably linked to the Separation
of Powers doctrine." Justice Scalia criticized the more prudential justifica-
460. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 496 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., Ran-
dom House 2001).
461. Scalia, supra note 23, at 881. For criticism of this view see, for example, Gene Ni-
chol, supra note 21; and Treister, supra note 83, at 691.
462. For a discussion about how standing doctrine has come to replace the political ques-
tion doctrine, see Linda Sandstrom Simard, Standing Alone: Do We Still Need the Political
Question Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REv. 303, 306 (1996) (arguing that the separation of pow-
ers function of the political question doctrine has been supplanted by the emergence of a
substantive standing doctrine).
463. Scalia, supra note 23, at 881. For an additional article discussing the separation of
powers concerns of standing, see David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation
of Powers Analysis, 1984 Wisc. L. REv. 37 (1984).
464. Scalia, supra note 23, at 885.
[Vol. 30
STANDING IN THE WAY OF CLARITY
tions of standing such as concrete adverseness, 465 and pointed to something
more in the purpose of standing doctrine.466
Standing has a major impact on the division of power between the var-
ious branches of government. Should parties, and by association issues, be
excluded from court, then compliance with constitutional mandates would
be left entirely to the whim of the Executive and Legislative branches.4 67 On
the other hand, should courts liberally grant standing to any and all parties
they would convert themselves into political fora-public interest firms
standing side by side legislative lobbyists.468
Standing serves a functional purpose: limiting the role of the judiciary
and restricting the courts to their "traditional undemocratic role of protecting
individuals and minorities against impositions of the majority., 469 This is
quite a contrast to court challenges of governmental action to vindicate what
is essentially an interest of the general public, such as the interest in gov-
ernment acting in accordance with the Constitution.47" A concrete injury,
apart from a mere breach of the social contract shared by all, is what distin-
guishes the plaintiff with standing and allows access to the anti-majoritarian
institution of the courts.4 ' Courts, unlike their elected counterparts, are not
designed to vindicate majority rights.472 They are insulated, indeed isolated
from public opinion and public accountability-something which helps re-
dress the rights of harmed individuals against popular action, but not those
of the people generally. 73 In this way, standing keeps the courts in their
proper role, solely vindicating the rights of individuals and preventing judi-
cial encroachments upon the democratic process.
While this view is provocative and persuasive, it has not been without
critics in the academy. Numerous scholars, most notably Cass Sunstein,
have taken issue with Judge Scalia's assertion of the separation of powers
rationale to standing, arguing that standing ill serves this rationale and
would be better focused on a litigant's personal interests.474 These critics
note that the constitutional separation of powers is not absolute; in fact re-
liance on "standing" to dismiss a suit thwarts separation of powers by abdi-
cating judicial authority.475 In these scholars' estimations, the principles of
the Separation of Powers doctrine determine the proper allocation of power
465. See supra Part III.D.2.a.
466. Scalia, supra note 23, at 885.
467. Id. at 892.
468. Id. at 893.
469. Id. at 894.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 895.
472. Scalia, supra note 23, at 896.
473. Id.
474. Treister, supra note 83, at 691.
475. Id. at 703.
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between the branches, but it is ultimately for the Court to ensure that the
other branches do not get too much power.476 Failing to hear matters of con-
stitutional import reduces judicial authority to an afterthought-something
clearly not intended by the Constitution.
These critics bring up a legitimate point about the limiting effect stand-
ing doctrine has on judicial authority, but it is not one that is unanswerable.
The premise of their argument is that for every constitutional violation there
must be some available litigant to raise the matter in federal court; after all,
the political system is simply too inefficient at redressing these griev-
ances.477 Such reasoning elevates the courts as above all fora for constitu-
tional disputes and the sine qua non guardian of the Constitution. Such an
emphasis on the judiciary is misplaced and not entirely consistent with the
overarching constitutional structure.
Above all else, our Constitution creates a limited democratic republic
and envisions an active citizenry to ensure that the government "plays by the
rules." Such appeals to the democratic process may fall on deaf ears; how-
ever, to dismiss them is to dismiss a hallmark of the American constitutional
order: democratic accountability. While such political action may be un-
wieldy, it is no less vital to a functioning constitutional system. The need for
democratic accountability is thwarted when the least democratic branch re-
moves issues from the political arena. It is true that because of standing re-
quirements certain suits and certain issues may never see the inside of a
courtroom, but that is not always a bad thing; in fact it creates an opportuni-
ty for democratic debate. Political issues are left to the political branches,
whereas fundamentally judicial issues-adjudicating the rights of individu-
als-are left to the judiciary. Such is the hallmark of our system of separated
powers.
3. Putting It All Together
With the foregoing principles in mind, this section turns to taxpayer
suits generally and Establishment Clause taxpayer suits specifically. With
the constitutional test of Lujan in mind as a mechanism of the foregoing
principles, the primary issue with taxpayer suits is whether they present a
cognizable injury-in-fact. As a rule, to meet this prong a plaintiff must show
the invasion of a legally protected interest that is both "concrete and particu-
larized" and "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'
' 478
At their heart, taxpayer suits seek to redress a grievance based solely
on an interest common to all taxpayers or the public at large. Such an inter-
476. Id. at 704.
477. Id. at 707.
478. See supra Part II.B.5.
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est would rightfully fall within the category of prohibited generalized griev-
ances against which the Court has oft spoken. Nevertheless, an injury does
not cease to be cognizable simply because it is commonplace. Indeed, if one
were only to look at the adequacy of a case that could be brought before the
Court, a taxpayer suit would seem ideal. It presents a situation in which the
legal issue is clearly presented and the Court can fashion any number of
judicial remedies. However, such reasoning runs counter to the overarching
separation of powers rationale stated above. Standing takes more than an
important issue and a willing litigant.
The injury issue could be broadly defined in this context, where for ex-
ample a taxpayer (or citizen) could be granted the right to sue on a breach of
the social compact theory. Although somewhat appealing for its Lockean
undertones,479 such a system would run counter to the notion of democratic
authority and accountability. Furthermore, the potential for mischief pre-
sented by such suits would empower the courts well beyond their constitu-
tional mandate to decide cases and controversies. Courts could presumably
pick and choose the issues they wish to address, thus leading to the charge
of government by injunction. Again, such notions run counter to the prin-
ciples of a democratic republic.
So what types of injury will suffice, and would taxpayer suits qualify?
The general injuries foreseen by the earliest Courts and even the modem
Court, excluding Flast, have been those injuries of the flesh and the purse.
Pocketbook actions and those implicating imprisonment, punishment, and
the like, and have been cognizable from time in memoriam. Most important,
however, have been violations of substantive individual rights such as the
freedom of speech or the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The key element to all of these suits is their individualist character.
Individuals suffer the harm individually and, as such, have redress through
the courts.
The problem with taxpayer suits, even those regarding the Establish-
ment Clause, is the nature of the supposed injury-an injury that invites
speculation and conjecture because it is impossible to point to some particu-
larized harm, individually sustained, other than psychological displeasure
with the results of a governmental action. Although this is important, indeed
vital, to the democratic process, it is ill served when transplanted to the judi-
ciary. At some point it falls upon the people themselves, not the courts, to
serve as the check on the excesses of the political branches. This is not a
flaw in the American constitutional system, merely a recognition that de-
mocracy has consequences. In the constitutional scheme, the people do not
479. "Lockean" refers to the influential English political philosopher, John Locke, who
was known for his contribution to social contract theory of government.
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abdicate their role to the courts merely because the issue may be controver-
sial or the remedy difficult.
Even if the courts recognized an injury-in-fact in these circumstances,
they would undermine the basic separation of powers function served by
standing when it comes to causation and redressability. The difficulty with
causation is much the same as with identifying the injury-in-fact, and thus
little need be said on that topic. With regards to redressability, however, it is
here that the courts undermine separation of powers, in effect empowering
themselves while minimizing the democratic accountability of the other
branches. After all, why would Congress act when they can pin all the blame
on the courts? In such circumstances, the courts become pawns, or at worst
willing accomplices, of ideologically motivated litigants. Such partisanship
runs counter to the prevailing role of the judiciary in the constitutional
scheme.
Applying the three pronged analysis of Lujan to taxpayer suits would
almost certainly eliminate taxpayer standing altogether, regardless of the
nature of the claim, but this can be a good thing. By applying the same anal-
ysis to these suits, the Court could go a long way towards restoring sense to
this area of the law and introducing constitutional principles to an area that
has persisted with little more than a "because we said so" rationale. As this
comment has attempted to show, Hein has done little to provide this much
needed sanity, and it will be up to future courts to renew the emphasis on
constitutional principles in taxpayer standing cases. Until such time that the
Court recognizes the mess it has created by its two inconsistent standing
doctrines functioning side by side, litigants and judges will have to deal with
the status quo and continue to make those arguments which deaden the soul
of the law, parsing precedents and drawing distinctions where none exist.
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